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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines why and how publicly-traded home builders might use index-based residential 
property derivatives to manage risk. After describing a number of alternative reasons for hedging, I argue 
for a paradigm for risk management proposed by Kenneth Froot, David Scharfstein and Jeremy Stein and 
augmented by Antonio Mello and John Parsons. According to this paradigm, the objective of hedging is 
to increase a firm’s financial flexibility by maximizing its liquidity – slack in the form of cash or unused 
debt capacity – when falling output prices reduce income and make it difficult to raise external financing, 
but do not reduce the firm’s need for funds. An important implication of this paradigm is that attempting 
to eliminate volatility in the value of a firm is not an optimal hedging objective, and attempting to do so 
can, in fact, reduce the value of the firm.  To illustrate how this paradigm might be used by public home 
builders it is applied to two hypothetical firms, each with a different capital structure and regional focus, 
and the potential benefits of hedging for each firm is discussed.  
The discussion then turns to the available real estate derivative products and how they can be 
employed as hedging vehicles. Key issues pertaining to the design of hedging vehicles are examined, 
including 1) how to choose a derivative contract, 2) how to choose an index or indices to use as the asset 
underlying the hedging vehicle and 3) how to address misalignment between the time to expiration of 
available derivatives contracts and the development time frames of residential communities. Evidence is 
presented that suggests hedging vehicles based on multi-market composite indices will probably have too 
much basis risk to effectively hedge against downturns in the prices of some builders’ homes. Finally, I 
describe a methodology for determining whether and how much a firm should hedge. 
 
Thesis Supervisor: David M. Geltner 
Title: Professor of Real Estate Finance, Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
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PART ONE 
 
 
 
 
Derivative contracts based on S&P/Case Shiller Home Price Indices began trading on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange on May 22, 2006 and derivatives based on Radar Logic, Inc’s Residential Property 
Indices began trading over the counter on September 17, 2007 (Krasny 2006 and Luthra 2007). Before 
they hit the market, these products were touted as revolutionary new tools for managing risks associated 
with shifting home prices, speculating on the movement of housing markets, reducing transaction costs 
and circumventing regulatory restrictions, taxes and accounting rules associated with trading and owning 
physical properties. Yet since their debut, the markets for housing derivatives have remained largely 
illiquid as trading volumes have grown modestly and unevenly. The lackluster pace of development is 
commonly attributed to a paucity of demand by “end-users,” the corporations, investment managers and 
investors who enter into derivative contracts to manage risk, speculate, remove costs, or avoid a rule or 
regulation (Naylor and Mansour). Educating end-users in the real estate field is now deemed essential to 
the evolution and development of well functioning property derivatives markets in the U.S.  
The objective of this thesis is to assist in the development of housing derivatives markets by 
educating a particular class of end-users about a particular use for residential property derivatives. The 
class is publically-traded home builders and the use is risk management. I have chosen to focus on risk 
management because, if the history of other derivatives markets can serve as a precedent for the way real 
estate derivatives markets will develop, then risk managers will play a seminal role in that development. 
Few derivatives markets have taken off without substantial and early interest from risk managers. I have 
chosen to focus on home builders because their industry entails inherent risks that lend themselves to 
hedging with real estate derivatives. Specifically, there is a substantial lag between the time home 
builders acquire land for development and the time they can bring their communities to market and sell 
homes. As a result, they are exposed to the risk that demand for housing will decrease during this period 
and they will not be able to dispose of developed properties or undeveloped land at expected prices.  
 I have chosen to focus on publicly-traded home builders in particular because a relatively small 
number of these firms are responsible for a significant proportion of annual US home sales, as illustrated 
below by Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Moreover, public home builders’ share of both new home sales and total 
home sales (including new and existing homes) has been increasing for over a decade. Thus, by focusing 
on public home builders, I am tailoring my analysis to a concentrated group of decision makers with the  
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FIGURE 1.1
New Home Sales and Public Home Builder Production
as a Percentage of Total Home Sales, 1983-2006
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potential to trade residential property derivatives in volumes measured in hundreds of billions of notional 
dollars. 
Figure 1.1 shows that while the ratio of new home sales to total home sales decreased between 1983 
and 2006, the contribution of large public home builders increased over that period as a percentage of 
total value and quantity of home sales in the United States. The chart combines data on new home sales 
from the U.S. Census Bureau with data on existing home sales from the National Association of Realtors 
(NAR) and compares these to the annual production and gross revenues of the top 15 public home 
builders, as reported by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB). New homes gradually fell 
from 18.64% of total units sold and 19.85% of the total value of U.S. home sales in 1983 to 13.96% and 
15.62%, respectively, in 2006. Over the same period, the annual production of the top 15 publicly-traded 
home builders increased from 2.37% of all units sold in 1983 (including new and existing homes) to 
4.53% in 2006. Likewise, the combined gross revenues of the top 15 public home builders increased from 
2.57% of the total value of all U.S. home sales in 1983 to 5.76% in 2006.  
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FIGURE 1.2
Production of Top 15 Public Home Builders
as a Percentage of New Home Sales, 1983-2006
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 Figure 1.2 illustrates the largest home builders’ increasing share of new home sales, measured by the 
quantity of units sold. In 1990, the top five home builders accounted for 5.65% of new homes sold. In 
2006, the top five home builders accounted for 20.37% of new homes sold and the single home builder 
with the most U.S. closings, D. R. Horton, Inc., accounted for 5.08% of new homes sold in the United 
States. The top 15 public home builders in 1990 accounted for 9.51% of the homes sold, whereas the top 
15 home builders in 2006 produced 32.42%. The top 15 home builders in 2007 are listed in Table 1.1, 
along with their gross revenues and U.S. closings for that year.  
This paper makes an original contribution to the existing literature on real estate derivatives by 
approaching derivatives-based risk management from the perspective of the home builder. In Part Two I 
examine why home builders should manage risk. After discussing a number of alternative reasons for 
hedging I focus on a paradigm for risk management proposed by Kenneth Froot, David Scharfstein and 
Jeremy Stein and augmented by Antonio Mello and John Parsons. According to this paradigm, the 
objective of hedging is to increase a firm’s financial flexibility by maximizing its liquidity – slack in the 
form of cash or unused debt capacity – when the firm needs it most: when falling output prices reduce 
income and make it difficult to raise external financing, but do not reduce the firm’s need for funds. An 
important implication of this paradigm is that attempting to eliminate volatility in the value of a firm is 
not an optimal hedging objective, and attempting to do so can, in fact, reduce the value of the firm.  The 
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paradigm is then put to work in a discussion of two hypothetical home builders, each with a different 
capital structure and regional focus, and the potential benefits of hedging for each firm is discussed. In 
Part Three I focus on the how of hedging with residential property derivatives. I examine key decisions 
pertaining to the design of hedging vehicles, including 1) choosing a derivative contract, 2) choosing 
which index or indices to use as the asset underlying the hedging vehicle and 3) determining how to deal 
with misalignment between the time to expiration of available derivatives contracts and the development 
time frames of residential communities. Finally, in Part Four, I bring the why and the how together and 
describe a methodology that home builders can use to determine whether and how much they should 
hedge. 
 
TABLE 1.1 
Top 15 Publicly-Traded Home Builders, 2007 
Rank Company 
U.S. 
Closings 
Portion of U.S. 
New Home 
Sales 
Gross 
Revenue  
(millions) 
Home Builder 
Gross Revenue / 
Total Value of U.S. 
New Home Sales 
1  D. R. Horton 37,717 4.86% 10,171 4.20% 
2  Lennar Corp. 33,283 4.29% 10,187 4.20% 
3  Centex Corp. 30,684 3.95% 9,732 4.02% 
4  Pulte Homes 27,540 3.55% 9,263 3.82% 
5  KB Home 23,743 3.06% 6,417 2.65% 
6  Hovnanian Enterprises 14,928 1.92% 5,334 2.20% 
7  NVR  13,513 1.74% 5,129 2.12% 
8  Beazer Homes USA  11,366 1.46% N/A N/A 
9  The Ryland Group 10,319 1.33% 3,033 1.25% 
10  M.D.C. Holdings 8,195 1.06% 2,933 1.21% 
11  Standard Pacific Corp. 8,051 1.04% 3,369 1.39% 
12  Meritage Homes Corp 7,687 0.99% 2,344 0.97% 
13  Toll Brothers 6,687 0.86% 4,646 1.92% 
14  Taylor Morrison 5,343 0.69% 2,477 1.02% 
15  Weyerhaeuser R E 4427 0.57% 2,359 0.97% 
Source: NAHB, Quinn Eddins
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PART TWO 
 
 
 
Section 2.1: Why Companies Manage Risk 
 
Why would a publicly-traded home builder, or for that matter any corporation, want to hedge? 
Corporations are generally owned by many small investors, each of whom bears only a small part of the 
risk. In fact, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means argue in their book, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, that the modern corporate form of organization was developed to enable 
entrepreneurs to disperse risk among many small investors. If that is true, it is difficult to say why 
corporations themselves also need to reduce risk – investors can manage risk on their own.  
Until the 1970s, finance specialists accepted this logic. The standard view was that if an investor does 
not want to be exposed to the risk of a particular market or industry, she can hedge for herself. For 
example, she can offset any loss that might come from a decline in oil prices by holding stocks of 
companies that generally benefit from oil-price declines, such as petrochemical firms. There is thus no 
reason for a corporation to hedge on behalf of its investors. 
Another argument against hedging derives from the Modigliani and Miller theorem, which was 
developed in the 1950s and became the foundation of modern finance. The key insight of Franco 
Modigliani and Merton Miller, each of whom won a Nobel Prize for his work in this area, is that value is 
created on the left hand side of the balance sheet when companies make good investments that ultimately 
increase operating cash flows. How companies finance those investments on the right-hand side of the 
balance sheet - whether through debt, equity or retained earnings – is largely irrelevant. These decisions 
about financial policy can affect only how the value created by a company’s real investments is divided 
among its investors. In an efficient and well-functioning capital market, they cannot affect the overall 
value of those investments.  
It follows almost as a corollary of Modigliani and Miller’s views that risk management strategies are 
also of no consequence. They are purely financial transactions that do not affect the value of a company’s 
operating assets. In fact, once the transaction costs associated with hedging instruments are factored in, a 
strict interpretation of Modigliani and Miller would suggest that risk management result in a net decrease 
in corporate value. 
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Since the 1970s, however, different views of financial policy have emerged that allow a more integral 
role for risk management. The following is a brief sketch of some potential rationales for corporate risk 
management in light of Modigliani and Miller that have been proposed over the past 30 years. 
 
A. Managerial Motives 
Corporate hedging is, in part, an outgrowth of the risk aversion of managers (Smith and Stulz). While 
outside stockholders’ ability to diversify will effectively make them indifferent to the amount of hedging 
activity undertaken, the same cannot be said for managers, who may hold a relatively large portion of 
their wealth in the firm’s stock. Thus mangers can be made strictly better off (without costing outside 
shareholders anything) by reducing the variance of total firm value through hedging. 
However, matters are not necessarily that straight forward because managers are often compensated 
in ways that encourage them to take more risk. For example, options given to managers as compensation 
are more valuable, all else equal, when the firm’s stock price is riskier. Thus, a manager’s risk aversion 
may be offset by compensation that is more valuable if the firm is riskier. This argument for hedging 
assumes that managers face significant costs when trading hedging contracts for their own account – 
otherwise, they would be able to adjust the risks they face without having to involve the firm directly in 
any hedging activities.  
Another managerial motive for hedging is based on the notion of asymmetric information in the labor 
markets (Breeden and Viswanathan, DeMarzo and Duffie). If labor markets revise their opinions about 
the ability of managers based on their firms’ performance, then some managers might undertake hedges in 
an attempt to influence the labor market’s perception. 
 
B. Taxes 
If taxes are a convex function of earnings, reducing the variability of a firm’s pre-tax value through 
hedging can reduce its tax liability (Smith and Stulz). The structure of a tax code is convex if effective 
marginal tax rates on corporations are an increasing function of the corporation’s pretax value, as 
illustrated by the curved line in Figure 2.1. 
In Figure 2.1, V1 and V2 represent the unhedged pre-tax value of a single firm in two different 
circumstances, one in which the firm’s pre-tax value is low and the other in which the firm’s pre-tax value 
is high. E(V) is the average of the values of the firm in these two circumstances, which is the expected 
pre-tax value of the firm over many time periods in a world in which the firm can only have values V1 
and V2 and is equally likely to have one value as the other.  If the firm is unhedged, it’s tax liability over 
time will be the average of its tax liability when its pre-tax value is low, which is represented by the point 
on the curved line above V1, and its tax liability when its pre-tax value is high, which is represented  by  
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FIGURE 2.1 
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V1 : Pre-tax value of the firm without hedging if state 1 occurs 
V2: Pre-tax value of the firm without hedging if state 2 occurs 
E(V): Expected pre-tax value of firm without hedging 
E(T): Expected corporate tax liability without hedging 
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Corporate Tax Liability as a Function of Pre-Tax Firm Value 
Source: Smith and Stulz (1985)  
the point on the curved line above V2. The resulting expected tax liability, E(T), is represented by the 
point on the straight line above the expected value of the firm E(V). 
Hedging reduces the volatility of the firm’s pre-tax value. If the firm perfectly hedges its operating 
cash flows it will earn enough money on its hedge to raise its pre-tax value to E(V) when its cash flow is 
low. Likewise, when its cash flow is high it will lose enough money on its hedge to lower it’s pre-tax 
value to E(V). When a convex tax function is applied to the firm’s expected pre-tax value the resulting tax 
liability is E(T:H), which is represented by the point on the curved line above E(V).  Thus Figure 2.1 
illustrates the proposition that the expected value of a convex function of random variables is greater than 
the value of the convex function of the expected value of random variables. This is an instance of the 
mathematical principal know as Jensen’s Inequality. 
A convex tax function implies that a more volatile earnings stream leads to higher expected taxes than 
a less volatile earnings stream. Convexity in the tax function is quite plausible for some firms, particularly 
those who face a significant probability of negative earnings and are unable to carry forward 100 percent 
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of their tax losses to subsequent periods. Even if a tax system does allow a loss to be fully offset against 
the profit from a different year, in present value terms, the loss will have a lower effective tax rate than 
that applied to profits. Either way, taxes generate a motive for corporations to hedge. 
 
C. Increased Debt Capacity 
Because of the deductibility of interest expense for tax purposes, firms may find debt to be a tax-
advantaged way to raise funds. However, lenders, fearful of bankruptcy, may be unwilling to lend to firms 
with risky cash flows. The amount that a firm can borrow is its debt capacity.  
A firm that credibly reduces the riskiness of its cash flows should be able to borrow more, since for 
any given level of debt, default is less likely. Such a firm is said to have raised its debt capacity. To the 
extent debt has a tax advantage, such a firm will also be more valuable (Smith and Stulz). 
 
D. Bankruptcy and Distress Costs 
An unusually large loss can threaten the survival of a firm for a couple of reasons. First, a money-
losing firm may be unable to meet fixed obligations, such as debt payments and wages. Second, if a firm 
appears to be in distress, customers may be less willing to purchase its goods due to fears that the firm 
will not be able to honor its warranties or service contracts. Thus, actual or threatened bankruptcy can be 
costly; a dollar of loss can cost the company more than a dollar. As with taxes, this is a reason for a firm 
to hedge using derivatives products that transfer income from states in which it is profitable to states in 
which it takes a loss. By reducing the variability of the future value of the firm, hedging lowers the 
probability of incurring bankruptcy costs (Smith and Stulz). 
 
E. Costly External Financing 
Suppose a home builder wants to purchase land for a new residential community. If the company has 
enough retained earnings to pay for the land, it will use those funds to purchase it. If the company does 
not have the cash, it will need to raise capital from one of two sources: the debt market (perhaps through a 
bank loan or bond issue) or the equity market. 
It is unlikely that the company would decide to issue equity. On average, less than 2% of all corporate 
financing comes from the external equity market (MacKie-Mason). The aversion to equity arises from the 
fact that it is difficult for stock market investors to know the real value of a company’s assets. Investors 
get the stock price right on average, but they sometimes price it too high and sometimes price it too low. 
Naturally, companies will be reluctant to raise funds by selling stock when they think their equity is 
undervalued, and if they do issue equity, it will send a strong signal to the stock market that they think 
their shares are overvalued. When companies issue equity, the stock price tends to fall by about 3% 
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(Asquith and Mullins). As a result, most companies perceive equity to be a costly source of financing and 
tend to avoid it. 
The information problems that limit the appeal of equity are much less of a concern when it comes to 
debt. Most debt issues – particularly those of investment-grade companies – are easy to value even 
without precise knowledge of the company’s assets. As a result, companies are less concerned about 
paying too high an interest rate on their debt than about getting too low a price on their equity. Thus it is 
not surprising that most external financing takes the form of debt. 
However, debt too has a cost. Taking on too much debt limits a company’s ability to raise funds in the 
future. Lenders will not lend to a company with a large preexisting debt burden because the company may 
use some of the new funds to pay off old debts instead of investing in productive assets. In the extreme, 
large amounts of debt can trigger distress, defaults and bankruptcy. So while companies often borrow to 
finance their investments, there are limits to how much they can or will borrow. 
Moreover, the cost of debt often increases just when firms need it most. If a firm is seeking to borrow 
because it is in decline, or otherwise unable to generate sufficient cash flows to fund its operations, the 
lender will raise the interest rate on the loan they offer the firm because they perceive a heightened 
probability of default. In fact, this can occur even when a firm is not in distress. The very act of 
borrowing can send a signal to the lender that all is not well in the firm, which will cause the lender to 
raise the interest rate of the loan. As mentioned above, the same problem arises even more severely with 
equity issues. 
 The bottom line is that financial markets do not function as efficiently as they do in the imaginary 
world in which the assumptions of the Modigliani and Miller theorems hold true. The costs outlined 
above make external financing of any form, debt or equity, more expensive than internally generated 
funds. Given those costs, companies prefer to fund investments with retained earnings if they can. In fact, 
Stewart C. Myers (1984) proposed that companies follow a financial pecking order in which they rely 
first on retained earnings, then on debt and then, as a last resort, on outside equity. Companies see 
external financing as so costly that they cut investment spending when they lack the internally generated 
cash flow to finance all their investment projects. One study found that companies reduced their capital 
expenditures by roughly 35 cents for each $1 reduction in cash flow (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen). 
These financial frictions thus determine not only how companies finance their investments but also 
whether they are able to undertake those investments in the first place. Internally generated cash is 
therefore a competitive weapon that effectively reduces a company’s cost of capital and facilitates 
investment. 
This insight forms the theoretical foundation for the view, expounded by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 
(1993), that the role of risk management is to ensure that companies have the funds available to make 
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value-enhancing investments. In general, the supply of internally generated funds does not equal the 
investment demand for funds. Sometimes there is an excess supply; sometimes there is a shortage. 
Because external financing is costly, this imbalance shifts investments away from the optimal level. Risk 
management can reduce this imbalance and the resulting investment distortion. It enables companies to 
better align their demand for funds with their internal supply of funds. That is, risk management lets 
companies transfer funds from situations in which they have excess supply to situations in which they 
have a shortage. “In essence, it allows companies to borrow from themselves” (Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein 1994). 
By hedging, the company reduces supply of internally generated funds when there is excess supply 
and increases supply when there is a shortage. This helps align the internal supply of funds with the 
demand for funds, as I will describe below. Of course, the average supply of funds doesn’t change with 
hedging, because hedging is a zero-net-present-value investment: it does not create value by itself. What 
it does is ensure that the company has funds precisely when it needs them. Because value is ultimately 
created by making sure the company undertakes the right investments, risk management adds real value.  
Mello and Parsons (2000) make an important contribution to the paradigm introduced by Froot, 
Sharfstein and Stein. While Froot et al treat the cost of external financing as exogenous to a firm’s 
hedging strategy, Mello and Parsons make it endogenous, arguing that the cost of external financing 
depends on the effectiveness of the firm’s hedge. They point out that, in addition to influencing the supply 
of internal funds, hedging affects a firm’s supply of external funds. As noted above, hedging can help 
make external financing more accessible by reducing the variability of internal cash flows, and thereby 
reducing the likelihood that the firm will not be able to meet its financial obligations. So while external 
financing is more expensive than internal financing, its cost, and therefore the amount a firm should have, 
is a function of its hedging strategy. Thus Mello and Parsons take the view of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 
one step further: The primary aim of risk management is to ensure that the internal and external supplies 
of funds are sufficient to cover the investment demand for funds, and to do so in a manner that minimizes 
the deadweight costs of external financing (negative market signals, financial distress costs, capital 
market illiquidity, etc.). 
The discussion of risk management strategies in this thesis builds on the strand of research that 
justifies hedging on the basis of costly external financing. While the other work on hedging has mostly 
focused on why hedging can make sense, the work in the vein of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein and Mello 
and Parsons focuses on how much and what sort of hedging is optimal for a particular firm.  
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A Paradigm for Strategic Risk Management* 
 
Fluctuations in macroeconomic variables create volatility in each of the key factors in the risk 
management equation: the demand for funds, the internal supply of funds and the external supply of 
funds. In certain circumstances, this volatility may threaten the firm’s ability to supply the funds it needs 
to execute its investment strategy, forcing it to pass up value-enhancing investments. To design a hedging 
strategy that will protect the firm’s supply of funds, it is necessary to understand how each of these three 
factors is exposed to risk:  
 
Internal Supply of Funds - Fluctuations in the price of a company’s products or in the cost of its 
inputs have an immediate effect on its internal supply of funds.  
 
Demand for Funds - A sharp and lasting increase in the price of a company’s product may encourage 
expansion and spur investment. Conversely, permanent increases in the cost of a company’s inputs 
may force a cutback in planned expansions.  
 
External Supply of Funds - If the price of a company’s output is depressed or its costs are running 
high then turning to outside sources for capital by issuing new debt or equity can become very 
expensive. If, however, the price of a company’s output is high, lenders would be much more eager to 
lend to them and one would expect the price of financing to be lower. 
 
Furthermore, a firm needs to understand how the risk exposures of these factors interact with one another. 
Does the company’s supply of funds match its demand? If prices fall, does the supply of funds drop faster 
than demand? How big is the gap? If a company has financial capacity to cover the gaps there may be 
little cause for concern. If not, the company may not be able to execute its investment strategy.  
Figure 2.2 illustrates how a firm’s internal supply of funds and demand for funds might vary as the 
price of the firm’s output changes in the future. The horizontal axis shows the relative price of a firm’s 
output at the end of a given period of time in each of a number of alternative scenarios, while the vertical 
axis shows the cumulative cash flow over the period. The steeper line records the cumulative supply of 
funds generated by the firm corresponding to each different possible price scenario. The greater the price  
                                                 
* The following is discussed in Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) and Mello and Parsons (1999). 
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FIGURE 2.2 
Exposure of Internal Supply and Demand for Funds to Changes in Output Prices 
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increases within the period, the higher the supply of funds accumulated. The slope of this line measures 
the exposure of the firm’s internal supply of funds to changes in output price. The flatter line shows the 
demand for funds as a function of the different possible price scenarios. Like the firm’s internal supply of 
funds, the demand for funds is affected by the risks and uncertainties facing the firm. The lower the 
output price, the lower the demand for funds. The slope of this line measures the exposure of this demand 
to changes in output price. Note that there is an internal funding deficit for low price scenarios: the 
internal supply of funds generated by the firm over this period is inadequate to meet the demand for funds 
in the company’s strategy. At high price scenarios there is an adequate internal supply. 
In Figure 2.2, the company’s demand for funds is inelastic: short-term changes in price have little 
impact on new investments and other capital expenses. If, however, new investments can be delayed 
when output prices fall, then the company’s demand for funds can be very elastic – that is, highly 
sensitive to price changes. The exposure of the demand for funds differs dramatically across companies 
and the exposure of any given company could also shift dramatically over time as its growth prospects 
develop and change. 
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FIGURE 2.3 
Exposure of Internal Supply and Increased Elastic Demand for Funds to Changes in Output Prices 
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Figure 2.3 shows the same internal supply schedule as Figure 2.2, but superimposes a more elastic 
demand schedule. Although the firm’s internal supply of funds has significant exposure to price risk, it 
does not have an internal funding deficit under any price scenario. As prices decline and the supply of 
funds is reduced, the demand for funds is also reduced. Volatility in the internal supply of funds does not 
disrupt this firm’s investment strategy and the firm will not benefit from reducing this volatility. 
There are a number of ways the firm can meet an internal funding deficit. For example, it can issue 
more debt to finance new capital expenditures. A proper evaluation of the firm’s total supply of funds 
must include these external financing sources. Figure 2.4 shows how external financing sources augment 
the internal supply of funds.  
Many firms have significant reserves in the form of unused debt capacity and a shortfall in the 
internal supply of funds will not disrupt the investment strategy of these firms. However, like the internal 
supply and demand for funds, external financing capacity is likely to change under alternative price 
scenarios. In Figure 2.4, for example, the contribution of external financing decreases as the price of the 
company’s output decreases. It may be easy to float additional debt when output prices are high, but it is 
much more difficult when margins are squeezed over a long period of time. Since the supply of external  
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Source: Adapted from Mello and Parsons (1999) by Quinn Eddins 
financing may also be exposed to price risk, identifying the true sensitivity of available financing to the 
company’s price risk is a difficult task requiring a good degree of judgment. 
Combining the internal supply of funds and the external funds available from financing gives a total 
supply of funds. This is compared with the demand for funds schedule to reveal the total funding gap. The 
total funding gap is significantly smaller than the internal financing deficit. However, the firm’s available 
financing capacity still falls short of its demand for funds in some price scenarios. In these cases the 
company may be forced into an untimely sale of stock or a cutback of its investment program. Both are 
costly and reduce shareholder value. 
Hedging can address the disparity when a firm does not have sufficient financial slack in the form of 
excess cash or unused debt capacity. There is a wide range of price movements for which the company’s 
demand for funds exceeds its supply. There is an even wider range over which the supply of funds 
substantially exceeds demand. Hedging enables the firm to use surplus cash in one range of price 
movements to cover a deficit of cash over another range. In effect, the firm sells some of its “upside” 
surplus of funds in exchange for a cash infusion on the “downside.” If the downside cash infusion enables 
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the company to make positive NPV investments it would otherwise have to forego, the exchange can raise 
shareholder value overall. 
Source: Adapted from Mello and Parsons (1999) by Quinn Eddins 
The simplest hedge is a sale of a set of forward contracts. The seller earns hedge gains in the event of 
a price fall and records hedge losses in the event of a price increase. The company’s financial slack is 
adjusted as a result of the hedge. This is shown in Figure 2.5, where the previous estimate of financial 
slack is revised to incorporate the result of adding a hedge of forward contracts with various maturities. 
As a result of the hedge, the company’s financial slack is raised when the price declines and lowered 
when the price increases. Since there is no funding gap at high prices, this reduction in financial slack is 
not costly to the firm. At the same time, it buys a very valuable increase in financial slack at those critical 
low price levels, enabling the firm to cover the remaining gap and avoid costly cutbacks to valuable 
investments.  
The risk management paradigm discussed in this section has implications for what and how much a 
firm should hedge. According to the paradigm discussed in this section, a proper risk management 
strategy ensures that companies have the cash when they need it for investment. It does not seek to 
insulate a firm completely from risks of all kinds (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1994). If a home builder 
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hedges only enough to guarantee that it has sufficient funds available for its investment needs, it will only 
be partially hedged. As a result, its stock price, earnings, return on equity and any number of other 
performance measures will fluctuate with home prices. When home prices are low, a public home builder 
will be worth less: the company’s existing inventory is less valuable, and it will invest less. It is simply 
less profitable to be in the home building business at such times and this will be reflected in the firm’s 
performance measures. But there is nothing a risk management program can do to improve the underlying 
bad economics of low home prices. The goal of risk management is not to insure the investors and 
corporate managers per se. It is to ensure that companies have cash they need to create value by making 
good investments. 
 In fact, attempting to insulate investors completely from home price risk could destroy value. If a 
home builder were to hedge fully it could put itself in a situation where it would have an excess supply of 
funds when home prices fall. When home prices are high the opposite would be true: the home builder 
would lose so much money on its hedging position that it would have a shortage of funds for investment. 
While the increase in the price of homes would raise the value of the home builder, only a small portion 
of this increase in value would be reaped as an immediate cash flow. Meanwhile, the full matching loss 
incurred on the hedge would have to be paid in cash immediately. Thus hedging fully would reduce 
liquidity and prevent the company from making value-enhancing investments. 
One might argue that completely hedging a firm’s value would create its own liquidity.  A hedge 
that successfully locks in the firm’s value offsets the short-term losses on the hedge with an exactly 
matched increase in anticipated future cash flows. Consequently lenders and external investors would be 
willing to finance the losses. However, Mello and Parson (2000) find that, in general, this is not the case. 
A hedge creates its own liquidity only if the firm is able to perfectly hedge all its different sources of risk. 
Otherwise, unhedged risk will decrease the firm’s debt capacity and increase the cost of its external 
financing. 
 
Section 2.2: A Discussion of Two Hypothetical Home Builders 
 
To build intuition about how this risk management paradigm can be applied to the home building 
industry, consider the case of two hypothetical home builders, Alpha Homes and Omega Communities.  
Both firms are widely held with shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Alpha Homes 
 
Alpha Homes earns one hundred percent of its revenues from building and selling residential 
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communities. The majority of Alpha’s communities are in Arizona, Florida and Texas. Alpha has focused 
its recent land acquisitions in markets where land is widely available and approvals are relatively easy to 
acquire. Since it is relatively easy for home builders to enter these markets, the supply of houses is high 
and margins are thin. Alpha compensates for these thin margins by building and selling very large 
volumes.  
Alpha’s demand for funds is driven by its need to pay operating expenses and fund several different 
types of investments. These uses of funds include: 
  
 acquisition of land for new communities,  
 entitlement and improvement of land,  
 construction of residential communities,  
 payment of interest, taxes and direct overhead related to development and construction, 
 repayment of debt, 
 repurchasing stock. 
 
The acquisition of land is Alpha’s single largest expense. It acquires land through direct purchases, 
land purchase options and participation in land and development joint ventures. Unlike commercial real 
estate developers and privately-held residential developers, who create separate capital structures for each 
acquisition, Alpha and other publicly-traded home builders fund the lion’s share of their land purchases 
from their central corporate treasury.  
Whenever possible, Alpha acquires land using purchase options. Under option contracts Alpha has 
the right without obligation to buy home sites at predetermined prices on a predetermined takedown 
schedule.  The contracts generally require the payment of a cash deposit or the posting of a letter of credit, 
which is typically less than 20% of the underlying price. They may also require monthly maintenance 
payments. Contracts are generally non-recourse, thereby limiting Alpha’s financial exposure for non-
performance. They allow Alpha to control land without taking on the risks associated with owning it. 
While the land is optioned Alpha can perform due diligence to determine whether its development plans 
will be profitable on the site and obtain the governmental approvals it will need to commence 
development. 
In addition to purchasing land directly and using purchase options, Alpha enters into joint ventures 
that acquire and develop land for their home building operations and for sale to other firms. Alpha’s 
partners in these land development joint ventures are generally other home builders, land sellers, financial 
investors or other real estate entities. Alpha’s management believes these joint ventures help them control 
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attractive land positions, mitigate and share the risk associated with land ownership and development and 
extend their capital resources. 
Debt service obligations, property taxes and overhead related to development and construction all 
contribute to the Alpha’s inventory costs. These costs create a substantial demand on Alpha’s operating 
cash flows. In the event inventory costs create too great a demand on Alpha’s funds, management can 
take the following steps to reduce its inventory of land and unsold homes: 
 
 limit new arrangements to acquire land,  
 engage in bulk sales of land and unsold homes,  
 reduce the number of homes under construction, 
 abandon or re-negotiate land purchase options,  
 sell underperforming assets, communities, divisions or joint venture interests.  
 
Though these actions may increase Alpha’s liquidity, many of them may also reduce future earnings and 
thus reduce the value of the firm.  
There is a lag between the time Alpha acquires land for development and the time that it can bring the 
communities to market and sell homes. Lag time varies on a project by project basis; however, 
historically, Alpha has experienced a lag time of up to three years. As a result, Alpha is exposed to the 
risk that demand for housing may decline or costs of labor or materials may increase during this period 
and that it will not be able to dispose of developed properties or undeveloped land at expected prices or 
within anticipated time frames or at all.  
In order to reduce its exposure to downward movements in the housing market, Alpha generally 
begins construction of its detached homes only after executing an agreement of sale and receiving a down 
payment from a buyer. Once a sales contract with a buyer has been approved, Alpha classifies the 
transaction as a “new sales order” and includes the home in its “backlog”. Such sales orders are usually 
subject to certain contingencies, such as the buyer’s ability to qualify for financing. At closing, title 
passes to the buyer and a home is considered “delivered” and is removed from the backlog. The average 
period between execution of a sales contract for a home and closing is approximately four months to over 
a year for pre-sold homes; however, this varies by market. 
Though most of the homes Alpha builds are under sales contracts, inevitable contract cancelations on 
the part of buyers mean that a certain number of houses in Alpha’s inventory will be unsold. Given high 
costs for carrying inventory and thin margins in many of its markets, Alpha can sustain substantial losses 
if it is unable to sell homes or other property in its anticipated time frame.  Thus Alpha quickly adjusts the 
prices of unsold houses to meet market demand in order to remove these houses from its balance sheet as 
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quickly as possible. As a result, prices for unsold houses are highly variable and can drop precipitously in 
soft markets.  
Alpha is also exposed to changes in prices for inputs and labor. It is generally unable to pass on any 
unexpected increases in construction costs to those customers who have already entered into sales 
contracts since those contracts generally fix the price of the house at the time the contract is signed. In an 
effort to reduce these exposures Alpha hires subcontractors to perform substantially all of its home 
construction and land development work on a fixed-price basis.  
Historically Alpha’s income has been its most significant source of operating cash flow. Recently, 
however, operations have used more cash than they have generated as Alpha has responded to strong 
demand for homes by making significant investments in inventory. To fund its acquisition of additional 
inventory, Alpha has taken on a significant amount of debt. As a result, Alpha’s debt is currently 57% of 
its total capital, which exceeds its long-term target level of 45 – 55% of total capital. Covenants 
accompanying Alpha’s debt obligations impose restrictions on its operations and financing activities. 
They limit Alpha’s ability to incur additional debt, pay dividends, sell assets (other than in the ordinary 
course of business) and invest in joint ventures. Should Alpha fail to comply with these restrictions and 
covenants, Alpha’s lenders could cause its debt to become due and payable prior to maturity or demand 
that Alpha compensate them for waiving instances of noncompliance  
Home Price Changes and Alpha Homes’ Liquidity 
 
Figure 2.6 illustrates how Alpha Homes’ supply of funds and demand for funds might vary across 
different home price scenarios. As noted previously, most of Alpha’s residential communities are located 
in markets with low barriers to entry. As a result, the margins between Alpha’s internal supply of funds 
and its internal demand for funds are very thin. When increasing demand for homes increases the market 
price for homes, Alpha can increase these margins. But when market demand decreases Alpha’s margins 
quickly disappear and then become negative.  
 
When demand for houses decreases Alpha sells fewer homes and the internal supply of funds 
decreases. Also, the number of sale contract cancelations increases, increasing the proportion of unsold 
homes in Alpha’s inventory. In an effort to reduce inventory, Alpha lowers the prices of its unsold houses 
to meet the reduced market demand. As a result, the exposure of Alpha’s supply of funds to home prices 
increases when demand and market prices are low.  
To offset the decrease in its internal supply of funds, Alpha can reduce its demand for funds by 
temporarily halting the acquisition of new land (be it through direct acquisitions, options or joint  
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ventures) and reducing the number of homes under construction. As a result, Alpha’s demand for funds is 
elastic with regard to downward movements in home prices. 
However, decreasing market demand also prompts Alpha to redouble its sales effort, which in turn 
increases its demand for funds in the form of broker commissions, advertising expenses and incentives to 
homebuyers. If market demand drops significantly, the increases in these selling costs can become 
substantial. Thus Alpha’s demand for funds is not as elastic to downward changes in price as it would be 
if it did not need to bear such selling costs.  
Some costs of carrying inventory, such as interest and land taxes, cannot be avoided even if the rates 
of land acquisition and construction are slowed. Alpha can reduce these costs and its demand for funds by 
selling off land in its inventory. These land sales also benefit Alpha by increasing its internal supply of 
funds. However, Alpha’s ability to sell land is severely restricted by covenants associated with its 
extensive debt obligations.  
Alpha’s external supply of funds can be defined as its debt capacity minus its current debt. Alpha’s 
current high debt ratio and the covenants associated with its current debt will limit the amount of 
additional debt it can take on in the future. Thus, the contribution of external capital will be small, even if 
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prices are high. When prices are low, the reduction in the value of Alpha’s assets will further reduce its 
debt capacity and thus its external supply of funds. 
As Figure 2.6 illustrates, Alpha Homes has a funding gap in scenarios when home prices are low. Its 
combined internal and external supply of funds is not sufficient to meet its demand for funds in these 
cases. If the funding shortfall prevented Alpha from meeting its debt obligations, the resulting financial 
distress could generate significant costs for Alpha’s shareholders. These costs could take the form of legal 
fees, write-downs or other deadweight costs associated with bankruptcy and financial restructuring. But 
even if Alpha were able to pay its debt obligations, simply having to curtail its land acquisition strategy 
could generate substantial opportunity costs. First, Alpha could lose out on economies of scale generated 
by building new communities on parcel adjacent to its current development sites. Second, it could lose 
market share in the markets where it currently builds communities. Third, it could be forced to pass up 
opportunities to purchase land in premier locations within its current markets. Fourth, it could be forced to 
forego opportunities to expand into new markets with growing populations and strong economic 
fundamentals. The cost of these lost opportunities could substantially reduce the value of the firm and, 
given the fierce competition for land in the home building industry, they could even threaten Alpha’s 
prospects for the future. 
Omega Communities 
 
Omega Communities is a home builder similar to Alpha Homes in its business model and the value of 
its assets. It differs from Alpha, however, in two key areas: the markets in which it builds its communities 
and its capital structure. 
Omega Communities seeks to build its communities in markets where land for new residential 
communities is limited and approvals are difficult to achieve, primarily in California and the Northeast. 
Omega’s top managers believe these communities have substantial potential value that will be realized in 
the future and that this value should not necessarily be sacrificed in a soft housing market. They argue 
that as the process for acquiring governmental approvals becomes more difficult as the political pressure 
from low- and no-growth proponents continues to increase, Omega’s expertise in taking land through the 
approval process and their current stockpile of approved land positions will allow it to grow in the years 
to come.  
Omega owns several years’ supply of home sites and management believes that, should the 
company’s business decline significantly, its current inventory would be sufficient to meet the 
requirements of their current backlog as well as any new sales contracts. Thus they would be able to delay 
or curtail their acquisition of additional land, which would reduce their demand for cash. 
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Omega’s debt is currently 27% of its total capital and over the past several years it has invested a 
significant amount of cash in short-term cash equivalents and short-term interest bearing marketable 
securities. Omega’s management believes their access to reliable capital and their low leverage ratio give 
them a competitive advantage during downturns in the national housing market. Based on their 
experience during previous downturns, they believe that difficult times can bring unexpected 
opportunities for firms that are well prepared. With $900 million of cash and cash equivalents and 
approximately $1.22 billion available under their bank revolving credit facility, they believe they have the 
resources available to fund these opportunities.  
Figure 2.7 illustrates Omega’s supply and demand for funds under different home price scenarios. 
The high demand and constrained supply in Omega’s markets allow it to have significantly wider margins 
than Alpha. Home prices can fall much lower before Omega’s internal supply of funds drops below its 
demand for funds. Moreover, Omega’s low debt levels and large cash reserves give it access to far more 
external funding than Alpha. As a result, Omega has a total funding surplus even in scenarios where the 
price for homes is very low. 
Total Funding Surplus 
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Case Discussion 
 
 Different Firms Need Different Hedging Strategies 
The cases of Alpha Homes and Omega Communities illustrate an important point: not all home 
builders should adopt the same hedging strategy. Even though all home builders are exposed to home 
price risk, some may be exposed more than others in both their operating cash flows and their investment 
opportunities. For instance, Alpha’s strategy of financing land acquisitions with large amounts of debt 
creates large debt service obligations that are inelastic to changes in home prices levels. As a result, Alpha 
is unable to significantly reduce its operating expenses during periods of low home prices by scaling 
down its operations. If home prices fall dramatically, Alpha may need to sell off land in its inventory and 
thereby sacrifice economies of scale, market share and important future sources of cash flow.  If debt 
covenants restrict Alpha’s ability to sell land, and it is unable to secure additional debt due to its high debt 
ratio and depressed home values, Alpha may be forced into bankruptcy. Conversely, Omega’s strategy of 
maintaining a low leverage ratio provides it with modest debt service obligations. As a result, Omega has 
the ability to reduce a much higher proportion of its operating expenses when home prices are low by 
scaling down its building and selling operations. Alpha has more to gain from hedging than Omega does 
because its demand for funds is less in sync with its supply of funds. 
Similar logic applies if we consider the investment opportunities the two firms face. Limited supplies 
of land and difficult approvals processes make purchasing and developing land more expensive in 
Omega’s markets than in Alpha’s markets. Thus, when home prices drop, it may no longer be worthwhile 
for Omega to acquire additional land, while it may still be worthwhile for Alpha to do so. Thus, even if, 
for the sake of argument, we assume that the drop in home prices affected both companies’ operating cash 
flows equally, Omega’s investment opportunities are reduced by more than Alpha’s. Again, since 
Omega’s demand for funds is more in line with its supply of funds, Omega has less incentive to hedge 
than Alpha does. 
To develop a coherent risk-management strategy, home builders must carefully articulate the nature 
of their operating cash flows and their investment opportunities. Once they have done this, their efforts to 
align the supply of funds and the demand for funds will generate the right strategies for managing risks. 
 
Should Omega Communities Hedge? 
Alpha Homes would benefit from hedging its exposure to housing market risk because its total supply 
of funds becomes poorly aligned with its demand for funds when home prices are low, and hedging can 
realign them by transferring cash from high price scenarios to low price scenarios. But would Omega 
Communities benefit from hedging as well? It might appear that Omega should be less interested in risk 
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management because of its conservative capital structure. After all, it could adjust rather easily to a large 
drop in cash flow by borrowing at relatively low cost. It would not need to curtail investment and 
corporate value would not suffer much. The basic objective of the risk management paradigm discussed 
here – aligning the supply of funds with the demand for investment funding – has less urgency for Omega 
because its managers can easily adjust to a shortfall in the supply of funds by borrowing.  
What Omega’s managers have done is use low leverage instead of the derivatives markets to protect 
against the risk in the price of housing. An alternative strategy would be to take on more debt then hedge 
those risks directly in the derivatives markets. The advantage of the second approach is that, while it is no 
more risky in terms of the ability to make good investments than the low-debt / no-hedging strategy, but 
the added debt made possible by hedging would allow Omega to take advantage of the tax deductibility of 
interest payments. 
 
Hedging as a Competitive Weapon 
The home building business is highly competitive and fragmented. Alpha Homes and Omega 
Communities compete with numerous home builders of varying sizes, ranging from local to national in 
scope, some of which have greater sales and financial resources than they have. In addition to competing 
for customers, home builders compete for financing, raw materials, skilled management and labor 
resources and, above all, for land.  
If a home builder does not hedge and its competitors do, that home builder risks losing market share 
to its competitors when home prices fall. The competition will have the funds necessary to make new land 
acquisitions and continue building and selling operations while the unhedged home builder might not.  
The converse is also true. If a home builder’s competitors choose not to hedge, they may not be in a 
position to purchase new home sites if home values fall dramatically: they will find themselves low on 
internally generated funds from home sales and they could also find additional external financing, in the 
form of additional debt or equity, expensive or unavailable. This is precisely the situation in which a 
home builder wants to purchase additional land – when its competitors’ weakness reduces the competition 
for land and therefore the price for land. This makes investment in new home sites more attractive. Thus a 
home builder should hedge to make sure it has an adequate supply of funds for this investment.  
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PART THREE 
 
 
 
Section 3.1: Choosing a Derivative Contract 
 
Hedging vehicles can consist of any of the available residential real estate derivative contracts: 
forwards, futures, total return swaps and options. The decision about which type of contract to use should 
depend on the liquidity of the various products and the different effects the products have on the firm. 
Different types of contracts will be preferable for different firms. In this section I describe the residential 
property derivatives that are currently available for trading and discuss how differences in their 
institutional design can impact a home builder’s choice of hedging vehicle. 
Derivatives Traded on Radar Logic Indices 
 
Forward contracts and total return swaps based on Radar Logic’s Residential Property Indices (RPX) 
are currently traded over-the-counter by seven licensed dealers. Radar Logic publishes indices for 25 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) as well as 25-MSA composite indices and indices for the Manhattan 
condominium submarket. Three separate indices are published for each market, with one-, seven- and 28-
day measurement periods, respectively. The measurement period is the number of days of housing 
transactions included in the calculation for each reported value of the RPX index.  
At the time of writing this thesis, the derivative products traded in the RPX market are based on the 
28-day measurement period for the 25-MSA composite as well as the New York, Los Angeles, Miami 
and Phoenix markets. RPX-based forward contracts are available for terms that expire every December 
31st from 2008 to 2012. Swap contracts are available with terms of six months, nine months, and one to 
five years. According to Fritz Siebel, Director of Property Derivatives at Tradition Financial Services, the 
most liquid RPX derivative contracts are one, two and five-year swaps, though volumes are still small 
relative other types of derivatives (Siebel). The underlying indices and terms to maturity for currently 
traded RPX contracts are summarized in Table 3.1. 
Settlement of RPX-based derivative contracts (including all quarterly payments for total return 
swaps) is based on an initial and final value (Lee and Tirupattur). The initial value is the average of the 
RPX values for the last five trading days of the month beginning the contract’s term and the final value is 
the average of the RPX values for the last five trading days of the month ending the term. This averaging 
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TABLE 3.1        
RPX-Based OTC Contracts Trading as of May 2007  
    
    
Total Return Swaps     
 Term to Maturity 
 6mo 9mo 1yr 2yr 3yr 4yr 5yr 
Composite 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
New York    9 9 9    
Los Angeles    9 9 9    
Miami    9 9 9    
Phoenix     9 9 9     
        
        
Forwards        
  Maturity Date 
  12/31/08 12/31/09 12/31/10 12/31/11 12/31/12 
Composite  9 9 9 9 9 
New York   9 9 9    
Los Angeles  9 9 9    
Miami  9 9 9    
Phoenix  9 9 9     
Source: Radar Logic, Quinn Eddins
 
is intended to minimize the effects of idiosyncratic single-day volatility. By way of example, consider a 
one-year contract that matures in June 2009. The average of the published RPX values on June 24th, 25th, 
26th, 27th, and 30th of 2008 (the last five publication days of the month) will constitute the initial value. 
The average of the RPX values published on June 24th, 25th, 26th, 29th and 30th of 2009 will determine the 
final index value. Moreover, Radar Logic uses a 63-day (i.e. nine-week) lag between the transaction date 
and the publishing date to allow for delays in receiving transaction data. Thus, the published RPX value 
for June 30, 2009 used to calculate the final settlement value will be based on transactions as of April 
28th, and if the index underlying the derivative contract has a 28-day measurement period, it is calculated 
using data from April 1st through the transaction date. 
 
Forward Contracts 
RPX forward contracts are quoted in terms of strike prices for specific maturities. The strike price is 
the expected growth in the index, from the initial to the final value. The payout at maturity is determined 
as follows: 
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( ) valueNotional%growthindexStrike%growthindexActual ×−  
 
If the difference between the actual index growth and the strike index growth is positive, the seller of a 
forward pays the amount calculated above to the buyer of the forward at the contract’s maturity. If the 
difference is negative, the forward seller receives the same amount from the forward buyer. This 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
FIGURE 3.1 
RPX Forward Cash Flows 
 
(Actual Index Growth % - Strike Growth %) 
× Notional value
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 Source: Morgan Stanley 
 
 
Total Return Swaps 
Total Return Swaps have emerged as the preferred instrument among market participants. In swaps, 
there are periodic exchanges of a fixed rate for an uncertain amount that represents the total return on the 
underlying index. Thus, a swap involves a total return payer and a total return receiver. The total return 
payer is short the index and the total return receiver is long.  
Total return swaps are quoted in terms of the fixed rate, which represents an annual percentage 
growth settled on a quarterly basis. The fixed rate is a non-compound annual rate. Thus, a two-year 
contract quoted as having a 5% fixed rate has a two year return of simply 10%. The total return receiver 
gets the actual return on the index and pays the fixed rate to the total return payer. This transaction is 
illustrated on Figure 3.2. 
FIGURE 3.2 
RPX Total Return Swap Quarterly Cash Flows 
valueNotional
4
%RateFixedAnnual ×  
Total Return Receiver 
valueNotional%GrowthIndexQuarterly ×  
Total Return Payer 
Source: Morgan Stanley 
 The quarterly total return payment is calculated as the actual quarterly index growth times the 
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notional value of the contract. The five-day averaging described above applies for calculating the relevant 
beginning and ending index values. The quarterly fixed payment is simply the annual fixed rate divided 
by four then multiplied by the notional value. 
Effectively, the fixed rate is the rate that equates the present value of the known payments to the 
present value of the expected total return payments over the tenor of the contract. In other words, the 
fixed rate is the market consensus expectation of the growth in the index over a given horizon. 
Derivatives Traded on S&P/Case Shiller Indices 
 
Futures and options contracts based on the S&P/Case Shiller Home Price Indices (CSI) are currently 
traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. CSI futures and options are cash settled to a weighted 10-
MSA composite index, as well as indices for its ten underlying markets. Currently, futures contracts 
based on the CSI are available for maturities out to five years. Contracts extending out to 18 months in the 
future mature quarterly while contracts that extend from 19 months to three years mature biannually and 
contracts that extend between three and five years mature annually. To date, trading of CSI futures and 
options has concentrated on the 10 MSA composite index and the New York, Los Angeles, and Miami 
indices (Siebel). 
TABLE 3.2      
Trading Volume of SPCS Derivatives on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, March 2008  
      
      
Average Daily Volume 
    2008 2007 
 March-08 Month Ago Year Ago Jan-Mar Jan-Mar 
Housing Futures 6 4 25 6 23 
Housing Options --- --- 11 --- 9 
Calls --- --- 8 --- 5 
Puts --- --- 2 --- 3 
      
      
Month-End Open Interest 
    % Change % Change 
 March-08 Month Ago Year Ago Month Ago Year Ago 
Housing Futures 505 489 1,565 3.2 -67.8 
Housing Options 414 414 1,924 --- 78.5 
Calls 84 84 610 --- 86.3 
Puts 330 330 1,314 --- 74.9 
      
 Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Quinn Eddins
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Table 3.2 summarizes the trading volume for CSI contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
Relative to other derivatives on the Exchange, these volumes are very small. While an average of 6 CSI 
futures contracts traded per day in March 2008, lumber futures averaged 1,894 contracts per day and 
Eurodollar futures averaged 3,047,802 contracts per day. Likewise, while CSI futures had open interest of 
505 contracts at the end of March 2008, lumber futures had an open interest of 14,236 contracts and 
Eurodollar futures had an open interest of 9,408,030 contracts. As of March 31, 2008, there were no open 
CSI option contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
Standard and Poor’s publishes CSI on the last Tuesday of each month and uses a two-month lag. (Lee 
and Tirupattur). Thus, the announcement on August 28th would be for the June index. The CSI has a 3-
month measurement period, so the June index would also include sales that took place in May and April. 
The longer measurement period tends to make the CSI less volatile than the RPX. 
 
Futures Contracts 
Each futures contract is valued at $250 times the CSI Index. At expiry, a short position in a futures 
contract is settled when the seller “delivers” cash to the exchange in an amount equal to $250 times the 
difference between the current, or spot, value of the index and the bid price specified by the futures 
contract. The latter was determined by the futures market on the day the contract was purchased.  As with 
forward contracts, the party with the short position receives payment, this time from the exchange, if the 
difference between the spot value and the pre-determined contract value is negative. A long position is 
settled when the index buyer receives cash in an amount equal to $250 times the difference between the 
spot value of the index and the offer, or ask, price specified by the contract. If the difference is negative, 
the buyer pays the exchange the same amount. The difference between the bid price and the ask price is 
called the bid-ask spread and is kept by the exchange. These transactions are illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.3 
CSI Futures Contract Cash Flows 
(Actual Index Value at Expiry – Pre-Set Bid Price) × $250 
Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange 
Party with Long 
Position (Buyer) 
Party with Short 
Position (Seller) 
(Actual Index Value at Expiry – Pre-Set Ask Price) × $250 
Source: Quinn Eddins 
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Option Contracts 
CSI options are European-style, which means they can only be exercised at expiry. Upon exercise, 
options turn into the associated futures contracts. Thus, a put option based on the New York index will, if 
exercised, turn into a short position in a New York futures contract. Likewise, a call option based on the 
Los Angeles index will turn into a long position in a Los Angeles futures contract.  
Exchanged-Based vs. Over-the-Counter Contracts 
 
 
Exchange-based futures contracts are formally equivalent to over-the-counter forward contracts. They 
perform precisely the same function – they lock in a fixed price today for a good to be delivered at a 
specified point in the future – and thus their value is calculated in the same manner. Theoretically, at 
least, a futures contract has the same value as a forward contract on the same underlying asset. 
However, despite their formal equivalence, forward and futures contracts differ in their institutional 
design, and these differences can influence a home builder’s choice of hedging vehicle, prompting it to 
choose one over the other in different circumstances. For example, one key institutional difference 
between forward and futures contracts is the need for interim cash settlement. Futures contracts require 
daily cash settlement of the gains and losses, while forward contracts are often settled only at the maturity 
of the contract. Of course, when there is no interim cash settlement and the hedge is losing money, a 
liability accumulates and is carried over time. When granting a forward contract, the counterparty to the 
contract is aware that the firm gets an implicit line of credit in the form of a loan with the maturity of the 
hedging contract. Assuming for the moment that hedging contracts are default protected, the line of credit 
accepted in the forward contract is exactly identical to the contingent debt accumulated from 
implementing a futures-based hedging strategy. Consequently, trading in forwards does not give the firm 
any greater financial advantage than that afforded by hedging with futures. Both the forward and the 
futures strategy imply a debt strategy (Mello and Parsons 2000). If the limits on debt apply equally to 
each contract, then the firm is indifferent between hedging with one or the other. 
However, this may change when we relax the assumption that hedging contracts bear no default risk. 
In the real world, the financing implicit in a forward contract is risky, while daily settlement makes the 
risk of financing a futures position minimal. While the intermediation of a market maker can make 
forward contracts less liquidity-sensitive, the market-maker’s concerns about default risk can prompt it to 
request collateral, which reduces further the financial slack available to the home builder. The choice 
among different hedging vehicles depends on which type of vehicle entails the debt package that imposes 
the lowest financing cost on the firm. Some home builders may prefer to pay to get the up-front, multi-
period line of credit inherent in forward contracts, while other home builders may prefer to get financing 
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contingent on the periodic gains and losses of futures contracts. Even if forwards and swaps avoid the 
periodic funding needs associated with marking futures positions to market, accumulated losses with 
these vehicles affect the value of the firm by triggering debt covenants specified in their contracts and by 
reshaping the incentives to manage the firm. 
 
 
Section 3.2: Choosing an Index or Indices 
 
To a certain extent, the choice of which index to use as the underlying asset for a hedging vehicle will 
be determined by the type of derivative product the home builder decides to hedge with. On one hand, if a 
home builder determines that exchange-traded futures and options fit its capital structure and business 
model better than over-the-counter products, it will base its hedging vehicle on S&P Case Shiller Indices. 
On the other hand, if a home builder decides to use over-the-counter forwards and swaps, then it would 
probably use Radar Logic’s RPX to underlie its hedging vehicle because the RPX market is currently the 
most liquid over-the-counter residential derivatives market. 
However, as liquidity in the property derivatives markets increases, as more products become 
available and as the existing index producers, and perhaps new index producers, begin offering products 
in both the exchange-based and over-the-counter markets, the decision about what index to use will 
become more and more important.† Even if the choice between the different index producers and their 
respective methodologies is immaterial to home builders, they will still need to decide whether to hedge 
using a single composite index or a portfolio of more granular indices. Therefore, home builders and other 
risk managers need a basis for determining what index, or indices, will make the best hedge against price 
changes in the housing market. 
Basis Risk 
 
There is an old saw among derivative traders: “The only perfect hedge is in a Japanese garden.” This 
refers to the fact that cash flows from a hedging vehicle will not change over time in exactly the same 
way as the exposure the vehicle is meant to hedge. This is true when managing financial risk, such as 
when a firm hedges its own borrowing cost with a futures contract based on deposits earning LIBOR, and 
it is virtually always true when hedging commodity prices, such as when a firm seeks to hedge oil 
delivered on the East Coast with a NYMEX oil contract, which calls for delivery of oil in Cushing, 
                                                 
† The latter is already beginning to occur. On Wednesday, February 27, 2008, Standard & Poor's announced that it 
had licensed Bear Stearns to trade over-the-counter contracts based on the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices. 
 36
Oklahoma. This potential gap between the performance of a hedging vehicle and the performance of the 
risk exposure being hedged is known as basis risk. 
 Basis risk is particularly problematic when hedging real estate assets because, due to their immobility, 
no two assets can ever be identical. Thus a derivative contract based on given asset or group of assets will 
never perform in precisely the same way as any other asset or group of assets. The only perfect hedge 
would be a derivative contract based on precisely the asset being hedged, but the specificity of such a 
contract would make it utterly illiquid; it would be extremely difficult to find anyone to take the counter 
position, and even then the cost associated with putting on such a hedge would probably be prohibitive. 
Of course, the home price indices currently available for derivatives trading do not track the prices of 
individual properties or even the aggregate prices of individual communities. They track aggregate home 
prices at the metropolitan area, and therefore may not reflect the particular market conditions that affect 
the asset to be hedged.  
A home builder attempting to hedge using index-based housing derivatives faces basis risk from two 
major sources. One is the potential for misalignment between the term to expiration of the derivative 
contract and the typical time horizon for purchasing, entitling, developing and delivering individual 
homes and residential communities. This issue can be overcome by various hedging strategies and will be 
discussed in Section 3.3.  
The second source of basis risk is the potential for the prices of homes in a builder’s portfolio to 
behave differently than the prices of most other homes in the encompassing market measured by a home 
price index. Home builders do not usually own portfolios of homes distributed randomly across a city. 
Rather, they build homes in particular neighborhoods where home prices may or may not change in 
tandem with the tradable home price indices. In fact, most new homes are built far away from existing 
homes. Home builders usually build large numbers of homes in places where they can purchase 
undeveloped land at prices that permit attractive returns on their investment. Such land is usually located 
far from city centers and the neighborhoods where most existing houses are located. Since the majority of 
residential property transactions in any metropolitan market are transactions of existing homes, and since 
the repeat sales methodology used to calculate the S&P/Case Shiller index excludes new home sales 
entirely, one would expect the available home price indices to track the prices of existing homes better 
than new homes.  
Figure 3.4 compares the cumulative quarterly growth of tradable composite home price indices to the 
cumulative quarterly growth of gross home building revenue per unit for three large home builders: 
Lennar Corp., Toll Brothers, Inc., and Hovnanian Enterprises. Home building revenue per unit 
approximates the average price of the homes a builder sells in a given quarter. Clearly, the available 
indices do not move in lock step with these builders’ products. While the indices increased by 120% 
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FIGURE 3.4
Cumulative Quarterly Growth of Home Price Indices and Home Builder 
Revenue per Unit, Q2 2000 - Q1 2008
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between 2000 and 2006, the average home prices of Toll Brothers, Lennar and Hovnanian Enterprises 
only increased by roughly 75%, 45% and 35%, respectively.  
Measuring Basis Risk 
 
To choose which index or indices to use as the basis of its hedging vehicle, and to determine how 
much to hedge, a home builder must measure the basis risk between the prices of the homes it builds and 
sells and the available home price indices. To measure basis risk, the home builder must identify the 
metrics it will use for measurement and define the exposure it wishes to hedge. Both are discussed here. 
 
Statistical Measures 
Home builders need to understand two statistical measures of basis risk in order to design and 
implement an effective hedging strategy (Smoke and Russell). The first measure is the coefficient of 
determination, better known as r-squared. If the prices of a home builder’s houses are highly correlated 
with a home price index or a portfolio of several such indices, they should exhibit a strong linear 
relationship. In other words, the pattern of price appreciation experienced by the firm’s homes should 
mirror the appreciation experienced by the index or indices. If the linear relationship between an index 
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and the prices of a firm’s homes is strong, the builder will be able to use instruments based on the index 
to hedge its risk. If the linear relationship is weak between the homes’ prices and the index, a home 
builder would not be able to hedge its risk. R-squared measures the strength of a linear relationship. It 
varies between 0 and 1, with the strength of the linear relationship increasing as r-squared approaches 1.  
The second measure a home builder would need in order to quantify the relationship between the 
prices of its homes and a home price index is known as beta. Beta is a key statistic used to determine the 
relative risk associated with individual stocks compared to the entire stock market or comparable index. 
The beta of an investment is therefore a way to measure the risk of a particular investment compared to 
the broader market based on relative volatility. The beta of a specific investment reveals if a particular 
asset is more or less volatile and therefore judged riskier than the comparable stock market index. If an 
asset has a beta of 1 its volatility makes it no more or less risky than the market.  
The beta of an asset is usually defined relative to a broad-based basket of securities meant to capture 
the overall movement of the equities markets. However, there are also instances in which the beta of a 
given asset is defined in relation to a narrower investment class. For instance, Peter Tufano (1998) 
measured the exposure of gold mining firms to changes in gold prices by calculating “gold betas” 
reflecting the volatility of a firm’s stock price relative to the volatility of prices in the gold market. Using 
beta as a measurement of the basis risk associated with index-based hedging vehicles follows the same 
principal. In this case, the home price beta measures volatility in the price of a specific property (or group 
of properties) relative to the volatility of prices in the broader housing market, as indicated by a home 
price index. 
 
Defining Exposure 
When calculating the basis risk posed by a given hedging instrument, one must consider the cash 
flows generated by the entire firm. Mello and Parsons (1999), Copeland, Weston and Shastri and others 
have observed that hedging individual transactions is sub-optimal and only adds to a firm’s value “by 
accident” because it is disconnected from the firm’s true value drivers. In the case of home builders, 
hedging home prices in individual communities is sub-optimal because it ignores the risk-reducing effects 
of geographical diversification and diversification by product type. Home builders frequently choose to 
build new residential communities in markets where home prices have little or negative correlation with 
the home prices in their current markets. Likewise, home builders will build communities catering to 
different types of home buyers (e.g. first time home buyers versus luxury home buyers) in order mitigate 
the risk of decreasing demand from a given demographic group.  This diversification into uncorrelated 
and countercyclical markets and product types effectively creates “natural” hedges. Any attempt to hedge 
the cash flows generated by a single residential community using financial instruments without taking 
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into account its correlations with the firm’s other communities could unhedge these natural hedges and 
actually increase the volatility in the home builder’s total cash flows rather than reducing it.  
So how can a home builder with communities in many markets hedge the cash flow of the entire firm 
using derivative contracts based on available home price indices? It can either use a single composite 
index that reflects home prices in multiple metropolitan areas or it can use a portfolio of multiple metro-
level indices.  
The Efficiency of Hedging with Composite Indices 
 
The advantage of using a composite index as the basis of a hedging vehicle is the relative ease and 
low cost of trading a single type of contract. The disadvantage of using a composite index is the increased 
basis risk caused by the inability to weight the various metro markets in the composite to reflect the 
geographic distribution of the home builder’s own communities. Table 3.3 describes the efficiency of 
using tradable composite home price indices to hedge the home building revenues of Toll Brothers, 
Hovnanian Enterprises and Lennar. The home price beta (βh) and r-squared were calculated using a linear 
regression in which the dependent variable was the quarterly percent change in home building revenue 
per home delivered and the independent variable was the quarterly percentage change in the index. Total 
home building revenue per home delivered approximates the average price of the homes a home builder 
sells across all its regions and submarkets. By using it as the basis for calculating the correlation between 
the price of a firm’s homes and a home price index, one accounts for the natural hedges created through 
diversification. 
The r-squared calculated in this regression is used to calculate the optimal hedge ratio for a given 
index. A hedge ratio is the ratio of the notional value of a firm’s position in a hedging vehicle to the value 
of the cash flow it seeks to hedge. For instance, if a firm hedges $100 million in home building revenue 
by taking a short position in a forward contract with a notional value of $50 million, the firm’s hedge ratio 
is 0.5. A firm can increase the correlation between its operating cash flow and the proceeds from its hedge 
by adjusting its hedge ratio. The “optimal” hedge ratio is the hedge ratio that maximizes this correlation 
and thereby minimizes the standard deviation of the hedged cash flow (methodology for calculating the 
optimal hedge ratio is discussed in the Appendix). An optimal hedge ratio cannot fully compensate for 
basis risk. A hedging vehicle that is poorly correlated to the cash flows to be hedged will not have a 
significant impact on the variance of those cash flows, whether the hedge ratio is optimal or not. Table 3.3 
indicates the degree to which hedging vehicles with optimal hedge ratios can reduce the volatility of the 
specified firms’ home building revenues.  
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 TABLE 3.3       
Statistical Measures of Basis Risk: Composite Indices (Q2 2000 – Q1 2008) 
  
Beta relative to the specified home price index (βh) and r-squared were calculated by regressing the 
quarterly percent change of home building revenue per unit onto the quarterly percent change in the 
composite home price index. The reduction in revenue volatility is the percentage decrease in the 
standard deviation of home building revenue per unit when it is modified by gains and losses from a 
hedge with the optimal hedge ratio. The methodology for calculating the optimal hedge ratio is discussed 
in the Appendix. 
    
Toll Brothers, Inc.1    
   
Index βh 2r  
Reduction in revenue volatility 
with optimal hedge 
Radar Logic 25 MSA Composite 0.28 0.10 5% 
S&P/Case Shiller 10 MSA Composite 0.41 0.15 8% 
    
    
Hovnanian Enterprises 1    
   
Index βh 2r  
Reduction in revenue volatility 
with optimal hedge 
Radar Logic 25 MSA Composite 0.37 0.10 5% 
S&P/Case Shiller 10 MSA Composite 0.66 0.22 12% 
    
    
Lennar Corp.2    
   
Index βh 2r  
Reduction in revenue volatility 
with optimal hedge 
Radar Logic 25 MSA Composite 0.18 0.03 1% 
S&P/Case Shiller 10 MSA Composite 0.39 0.08 4% 
    
    
1 Toll Brothers and Hovnanian Enterprises end their financial quarters in January, April, July and 
October. 
2 Lennar ends its financial quarters in February, May, August and November. 
    
Source: Radar Logic, Standard & Poor’s, Toll Brothers, Hovnanian Enterprises, Lennar, Quinn Eddins 
It appears that the composite home price indices currently available for derivatives trading are not 
efficient hedges for the homes these companies sell. None of the r-squareds for any of the firms surpasses 
0.23 and, as a result, no hedging vehicle based on these indices could reduce the standard deviation of 
these companies’ home building revenues by more than 13%.  Furthermore, all but one of the home price 
betas reported in Table 3.3 are between 0 and 0.5, indicating the prices of the home builder’s products and 
the composite indices have a very weak relationship, essential moving independently. Thus, it appears 
that derivatives based on these indices are not an effective means of hedging home builder revenues. 
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 TABLE 3.4       
Statistical Measures of Basis Risk: Composite Indices with 1-Quarter Lead and Lag  
(Q3 2000 – Q4 2007) 
 
Beta relative to the specified home price index (βh) and r-squared were calculated using linear 
regression. The dependent variable was the quarterly percent change of home building revenue per unit 
and the independent variable was a rolling three-quarter average of quarterly percent change in the 
composite home price index. The three quarters included in the rolling average were the quarter in which 
the dependent variable was observed, the preceding quarter and the subsequent quarter. The reduction 
in revenue volatility is the percentage decrease in the standard deviation of home building revenue per 
unit when it is modified by gains and losses from a hedge with the optimal hedge ratio. The calculation of 
optimal hedge ratios is discussed in the Appendix. 
    
Toll Brothers, Inc.1    
   
Index βh 2r  
Reduction in revenue volatility 
with optimal hedge 
Radar Logic 25 MSA Composite 0.32 0.04 2% 
S&P/Case Shiller 10 MSA Composite 0.34 0.06 3% 
    
    
Hovnanian Enterprises 1    
   
Underlying Index βh 2r  
Reduction in revenue volatility 
with optimal hedge 
Radar Logic 25 MSA Composite 0.31 0.03 2% 
S&P/Case Shiller 10 MSA Composite 0.31 0.04 2% 
    
    
Lennar Corp.2    
   
Underlying Index βh 2r  
Reduction in revenue volatility 
with optimal hedge 
Radar Logic 25 MSA Composite 0.44 0.07 4% 
S&P/Case Shiller 10 MSA Composite 0.55 0.10 5% 
    
    
1 Toll Brothers and Hovnanian Enterprises end their financial quarters in January, April, July and 
October. 
2 Lennar ends its financial quarters in February, May, August and November. 
 
Source: Radar Logic, Standard & Poor’s, Toll Brothers, Hovnanian Enterprises, Lennar, Quinn Eddins 
Worse, taking a position in an inefficient hedging vehicle can have negative implications for taxes. 
According to Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 133, a derivative transaction must pass certain 
correlation tests in order to be deemed a hedge and thereby qualify for more lenient tax treatment than 
transactions considered speculative (Naylor and Mansour). One such test is based on regressing the 
change in value of the derivative on the change in value of the hedged asset. Common practice suggests  
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TABLE 3.5       
Statistical Measures of Basis Risk: Composite Indices with 1 and 2-Quarter Lags  
(Q2 2000 – Q3 2007) 
 
Beta relative to the specified home price index (βh) and r-squared were calculated using linear 
regression. The dependent variable was the quarterly percent change of home building revenue per 
unit and the independent variable was a rolling three-quarter average of quarterly percent change in the 
composite home price index. The three quarters included in the rolling average were the quarter in 
which the dependent variable was observed and the quarters ending three and six months thereafter. 
The reduction in revenue volatility is the percentage decrease in the standard deviation of home 
building revenue per unit when it is modified by gains and losses from a hedge with the optimal hedge 
ratio. The calculation of optimal hedge ratios is discussed in the Appendix. 
    
Toll Brothers, Inc.1    
   
Index βh 2r  
Reduction in revenue volatility 
with optimal hedge 
Radar Logic 25 MSA Composite 0.19 0.02 1% 
S&P/Case Shiller 10 MSA Composite 0.39 0.08 4% 
    
    
Hovnanian Enterprises 1    
   
Underlying Index βh 2r  
Reduction in revenue volatility 
with optimal hedge 
Radar Logic 25 MSA Composite -0.09 0.00 0% 
S&P/Case Shiller 10 MSA Composite 0.06 0.00 0% 
    
    
Lennar Corp.2    
   
Underlying Index βh 2r  
Reduction in revenue volatility 
with optimal hedge 
Radar Logic 25 MSA Composite 0.22 0.02 1% 
S&P/Case Shiller 10 MSA Composite 0.49 0.07 4% 
    
    
1 Toll Brothers and Hovnanian Enterprises end their financial quarters in January, April, July and 
October. 
2 Lennar ends its financial quarters in February, May, August and November. 
 
Source: Radar Logic, Standard & Poor’s, Toll Brothers, Hovnanian Enterprises, Lennar, Quinn Eddins 
 
that the adjusted r-squared of this regression should be above 80%. Clearly, hedging with a composite 
index does not meet this threshold for the three home builders discussed here.  
It is possible that, despite the lags built into the indices, temporal misalignments persist between the 
index values and the actual value of homes transacted in a given period. In other words, the index may not 
reflect all the transactions that occurred during the period it represents. Such misalignments could 
increase basis risk and reduce the efficiency of hedging with index-based property derivatives. A home 
builder could try to account for such temporal misalignments in price movements by taking positions in a 
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portfolio of derivatives with different expiration dates. For instance, a firm might try to hedge its exposure 
for the second quarter of a given year using a portfolio of derivatives that expire at the end of the first, 
second and third quarters. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 describe the basis risk associated with using portfolios of three equally-weighted 
derivatives expiring in successive quarters to hedge the per unit home building revenues of the three firms 
discussed above. The betas and r-squareds were calculated using linear regressions in which the 
independent variables were rolling three-quarter averages of the quarterly returns to the tradable 
composite indices. As in Figure 3.3, the dependent variables were the quarterly percent change in the 
firms’ home building revenues per home sold. In Figure 3.4, the three quarters included in the rolling 
average were the quarter in which the dependent variable was observed, the preceding quarter and the 
subsequent quarter. In Figure 3.5, the rolling average consists of the quarter in which the revenue per unit 
was observed as well as the quarters ending three and six months thereafter.  
Clearly the three quarter average returns are no better correlated with the prices of the builders’ 
homes than the returns of a single composite index. None of the r-squareds exceed 11%, and only one of 
the betas exceeds .5. Thus it appears that, even when led and lagged indices are introduced to the hedging 
portfolio, vehicles based on available composite indices have too much basis risk to allow these home 
builders to effectively hedge the revenue from their home sales. 
The Efficiency of Hedging with MSA-Level Indices 
 
An alternative to hedging with derivative contracts based on composite indices is hedging with a 
portfolio of derivatives based on MSA-level indices. This strategy allows home builders to adjust the 
weights of the indices in the portfolio to better reflect the location of their communities, thereby lowering 
basis risk relative to a hedge based on a composite index. However, this strategy raises the practical 
problems of having to choose which indices to use and how much weight to give each derivative relative 
to the others in the portfolio. If indices are available for all the markets in which a home builder sells 
houses, then the home builder might be able to efficiently hedge with a portfolio based on the home price 
indices that correspond to the metro markets in which it operates. The weight of each index within the 
hedging portfolio could be proportionate to the corresponding market’s contribution to the firm’s total 
revenue. However, most public home builders are active in many markets for which no indices are 
currently available. Thus it would not be optimal for them to weight the indices in their hedging portfolio 
in this way. Rather, it would be better to weight the indices in the portfolio according to the betas derived 
by regressing forecasted future movements in the firm’s home building revenues onto forecasted future 
movements in the available indices. This would also capture the volatility-reducing effects of 
diversification across markets and, as a result, could reduce the total notional value of the hedge.  
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A home builder who chooses to hedge with a basket of MSA-level derivatives would need to adopt a 
dynamic hedging strategy in which it regularly adjusted the weights of the indices in its hedging portfolio. 
This would be necessary because home builders are constantly changing the make-up of their portfolio of 
homes in the direct housing market by entering new markets and leaving old markets, or building new 
product types and discontinuing old product types with different price points. Moreover, the home builder 
needs to account for the fact that home price correlations across MSAs change over time and, as a result, 
the extent of the benefit from diversification does too. Thus, the right mix of indices in a hedging vehicle 
will vary from firm to firm and from time to time.  
 
Another Option: Bespoke indices 
One would expect finer geographic resolution to improve the correlation between the home builder’s 
cash flows and the index, at least until the point where improved specificity is swamped by the 
measurement error, or “noise”, that arises from the small number of observations. At the request of a 
dealer in the RPX market, Radar Logic can produce specialized indices for markets not included in the 27 
indices it currently publishes.  These “bespoke” indices can be produced for most metropolitan markets in 
the United States as well as submarkets defined by geography, down to the zip code level, and product 
type. Hedging vehicles based on these indices could offer such fine-grain resolution and greatly reduce 
basis risk as a result. Of course, the caveat to entering into derivative contracts on unique sub-indices, 
however, is that the trade is likely to be expensive and virtually impossible to exit before the contract’s 
end date. 
 
Section 3.3: Timing 
 
 The time frame of available forwards, futures, options, and swaps may not be aligned with the typical 
time horizon for purchasing, entitling, developing and delivering individual homes and residential 
communities. Once a parcel of land has been approved for development, it generally takes four to five 
years to fully develop, sell and deliver all the homes in typical communities. Longer and shorter time 
periods are possible depending on the ease or difficulty of attaining approvals, the number of home sites 
in a community and the sales and delivery pace of the homes in a community. Master planned 
communities, consisting of several smaller communities, may take up to ten years or more to complete. In 
the case of a downturn in the housing market, the aforementioned estimated community lives may be 
significantly longer.  
As mentioned above, property futures with maturities out to five years are available on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange. Likewise, over-the-counter forwards and total return swaps are available with 
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tenors of up to five years. Thus, the longest-lived futures contracts correspond to the development time 
lines of many residential communities. However, until the markets for property derivatives mature and 
become thoroughly liquid, the longest-lived contracts may be hard to come by. And if they are available, 
they are likely to be expensive, as market makers charge large premiums and bid-ask spreads in 
compensation for the risk that they will not be able to find investors to take the counter position. These 
hedging costs could prove prohibitive for home builders.  
Fortunately, the mismatch between the development time-lines of residential communities and the 
maturities of index-based housing derivatives can be overcome with various hedging strategies. One such 
strategy is a stack hedge, in which a firm enters into forward or futures contracts with a single maturity, 
with the notional value of the position calibrated so that the changes in the present value of the future 
obligations are offset by changes in the value of this “stack” of derivative contracts (McDonald).When the 
near-term contract matures, the firm reestablishes the stack hedge by taking a short position in contracts 
with a new near-term maturity. This process of stacking derivative contracts in the near term contract and 
then rolling over into the new near-term contract is called a stack and roll.  
There are other strategies, similar to the stack and roll, that combine contracts of various maturities 
into a hedge position. For example, if a home builder decides to hedge the revenues from homes that are 
scheduled to be completed and sold in four years, but no four-year contracts are available, the firm could 
instead hold some short-term contracts with, say, 1 year tenors and some longer term contracts with say, 3 
year tenors. As with the stack and roll, the notional value of the position would be calibrated to match the 
present value of the expected future home building revenues. However, this hedging strategy will likely 
be better than a stack of all short-term contracts because it better aligns the average maturity of the hedge 
with the time it takes to build and sell the homes that the builder is trying to hedge. 
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PART FOUR 
 
 
 
In Part Two I argued that the objective of hedging is to increase a firm’s financial flexibility by 
maximizing its liquidity – slack in the form of cash or unused debt capacity – when the firm needs it 
most: when falling output prices reduce income and make it difficult to raise external financing, but do 
not reduce the firm’s need for funds. A successful hedging strategy, according to this paradigm, lowers 
the danger of costly financial distress, reduces the costs imposed by external financial constraints and 
makes value maximizing investments affordable. Such a strategy effectively redistributes cash balances 
across different states and periods, taking cash from those periods in which the marginal costs of financial 
constraints (including direct financing costs, opportunity costs and the costs of financial distress) is low 
and giving cash to those states for which the marginal cost is high. In Part Three I discussed some 
important decisions pertaining to the design of hedging vehicles, including the choice of derivative 
contract, the choice of underlying indices and the choice of strategies for correcting temporal 
misalignment between the expiration of available derivatives and the development time frames of 
residential communities. I provided evidence that hedging vehicles based on composite indices will have 
too much basis risk to effectively hedge against downturns in the average price of some builders’ homes.  
In Part Four I conclude my thesis by bringing together the why and how of hedging in a discussion 
about how to calculate the notional value of a hedging vehicle. The first step is to evaluate the company’s 
exposure to the volatility of home prices. To do this, a home builder should construct pro forma financial 
projections and calculate its cumulative internal supply of funds, demand for funds, and external supply 
of funds over the period it wishes to hedge. The first two are relatively straightforward to calculate. The 
necessary information can be found on standard pro forma financial statements. Assessing the firm’s 
external supply of funds is a more complicated matter. In addition to forecasting proceeds from new 
issues of long-term debt, scheduled repayments on existing debt and the firm’s anticipated dividend 
streams, a home builder must estimate its unused capacity to access the capital markets. Most of a firm’s 
available and untapped sources of external financing do not show up on a standard pro forma cash flow 
statement; rather, they need to be identified and quantified. This requires a good deal of judgment. 
The home builder should construct projections for a wide range of scenarios in order to produce a 
schedule of the supply of funds and demand for funds as a function of the cumulative home price changes 
over the time horizon analyzed. This allows a home builder to forecast whether there will be a funding 
deficit, how much it will be and when it will occur. Table 4.1 illustrates such a schedule for the Alpha  
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TABLE 4.1      
Calculating Alpha Homes'  Total Funding Gap for a Range of Scenarios    
(Millions of inflation adjusted dollars)     
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 Home Price Scenario: 12% Annual Increase  
Cumulative Internal Supply of Funds 743 1223 1991  3172 4963 
Cumulative External Supply of Funds 108 215 315  392 468 
Net Supply 851 1437 2305  3564 5431 
Cumulative Demand for Funds (689) (1099) (1734) (2677) (4054)
Total Funding Surplus (Gap) 162 338 571  887 1377 
      
 Home Price Scenario: No Change           
Cumulative Internal Supply of Funds 628 877 1208  1623 2133 
Cumulative External Supply of Funds 54 101 118  103 73 
Net Supply 682 978 1326  1726 2206 
Cumulative Demand for Funds (610) (863) (1206) (1645) (2195)
Total Funding Surplus (Gap) 72 115 120  81 11 
      
 Home Price Scenario: 2% Annual Decrease           
Cumulative Internal Supply of Funds 612 814 1082  1439 1914 
Cumulative External Supply of Funds 46 86 95  77 47 
Net Supply 658 900 1178  1516 1961 
Cumulative Demand for Funds (596) (826) (1130) (1507) (1966)
Total Funding Surplus (Gap) 62 73 47  9 (5)
      
 Home Price Scenario: 8% Annual Decrease           
Cumulative Internal Supply of Funds 529 608 700  805 925 
Cumulative External Supply of Funds 24 46 41  19 0 
Net Supply 553 654 740  823 925 
Cumulative Demand for Funds (557) (721) (922) (1146) (1392)
Total Funding Surplus (Gap) (4) (67) (182) (323) (467)
      
Source: Quinn Eddins
 
Homes, the hypothetical home builder discussed in Part Two. It shows that if the prices of its homes 
decrease by an average of two percent a year for five years, Alpha will not have sufficient funds to 
implement its investment strategy in year five. If the prices of Alpha’s homes fall by eight percent a year, 
it will suffer a funding gap by the end of the first year. 
By observing the supply and demand for funds at different points of time under a range of price 
scenarios, the firm can calculate how large of a position it should take in its chosen hedging vehicle. The 
proper position will be sufficiently large to ensure that the proceeds from the hedge in low price scenarios 
will augment internally generated funds enough to cover the firm’s demand for funds. Of course, the 
hedging vehicle will earn a loss in more optimistic scenarios. Thus the notional value of the hedging 
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vehicle should be large enough to eliminate funding deficits in the low price scenarios, but should not be 
so large as to create funding deficits in the high price scenarios. If there is no notional amount for which 
deficits in both the high or low scenarios are avoidable, the notional amount of the hedge should be that 
which creates the smallest possible deficit. 
Table 4.1 provides a stylized example of how to calculate Alpha’s exposure to changes in home 
prices. For this purpose, four price scenarios suffice. To describe uncertainty more realistically, however, 
it is necessary to consider all possible occurrences. In statistical terms, this means getting the distribution 
of possible outcomes by giving the proper weight to each possible outcome according to its probability of 
occurrence. This can be done using simulation techniques. 
As in any model of reality, these simulations must be fed the right parameters. Inflation-adjusted 
housing prices appear to revert to a long-term mean (Eichholtz and Geltner). However, in their 
convergence to the long-term mean, prices are often subjected to random shocks. Deviations from the 
path to convergence depend on the volatility of the prices. Therefore, to generate sequences of future 
prices it is necessary to input into the simulation algorithm sensible values for the long-term price level, 
speed of adjustment and volatility. These three parameters can suffice to describe the distribution of 
prices at any future date, provided a sufficiently large number of iterations of the simulation are produced. 
Multiple iterations can be produced with the help of the random number generator of modern spreadsheet 
applications. 
Once a firm’s exposure has been forecasted and the notional value of the hedge has been calculated, 
that value must be adjusted by a hedge ratio in order to correct for the basis risk of the hedging vehicle. 
Assuming that derivatives based on composite indices will entail too much basis risk, home builders will 
want to use hedging vehicles based on multiple indices with a finer geographical resolution, such a the 
published MSA-level indices or, if possible, bespoke indices for their specific markets. The appropriate 
weight of an index relative to the others in the portfolio is its beta coefficient as determined by the linear 
regression specified by the following equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ni IIIIUnit
v Δ++Δ+Δ+Δ+=⎟⎠
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⎛Δ ββββα K332211Re  
 
The dependent variable, on the left hand side of the equation, is the forecasted percent change per period 
of the home builder’s revenue per unit. The independent variables, on the right hand side of the equation, 
are the forecasted changes ( Δ ) per period in indices 1 through n (e.g. I1 – In). α is the intercept point of 
the regression line and the y axis. 
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Once the index weights have been calculated, the hedge ratio for the entire portfolio can be calculated 
by multiplying the forecasted changes in the indices by their respective weights, adding the products 
together and then regressing the home builder’s forecasted revenues onto the sum. This is expressed in the 
following equation: 
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The hedge ratio for the hedging portfolio is the beta coefficient generated by the regression ( Pβ ). For 
example, if the beta coefficient is 0.6, then for every one percent that the hedging portfolio changes, the 
home builder’s revenues per unit change 0.6 percent. Therefore, in order to compensate for the fact that 
the hedging vehicle is more volatile than the prices of the output the home builder is trying to hedge, the 
notional value of the hedge should be reduced, in this case, by a factor of 0.6. If the hedging portfolio 
were less volatile than the home builder’s revenue, generating a beta coefficient of, say, 1.3, then the 
notional value of the hedge would have to be increased by a multiple of 1.3 in order to increase the 
proceeds from the smaller changes in value (i.e. lower volatility). 
The methodology described in this section requires a great deal of forecasting. The home builder’s 
future revenues, expenses, and investment opportunities, the quantity of the units it will produce, and the 
future values of the home price indices all must be forecasted in order to calculate a the notional value of 
the firm’s hedge. The quality of the hedge will depend in large part on the quality of the forecasts. Of 
course, forecasts become less reliable the further they extend into the future. Therefore, attempting to 
hedge exposures more than a few quarters into the future will be difficult and the outcome could be 
unreliable. For this reason, the hedging strategy described in this thesis is best applied to short–term 
exposures to home price risk. As a result, the hedges will not account for potentially large price changes 
in more remote time periods. This will be problematic for home builders given their long development 
timelines. Nevertheless, while not perfect, the hedging strategy described herein could provide a 
significant strategic and competitive advantage when housing prices fall. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Hedge Ratios and Hedging Efficiency 
 
The following discussion is adapted from Copeland, Weston and Shastri. In this thesis I use the term 
“hedge ratio” in the context of discussing basis risk, which, in this case, is the risk that arises from 
imperfect correlation between movements in the price of a firm’s output and movements in the index 
underlying its hedging vehicle. In this context, a hedge ratio is the notional value of a home builder’s 
hedging vehicle(s) divided by the value of the homes it is seeking to hedge. For instance, if a home 
builder hedges $100 million of revenue from home sales by taking a short position in forward contracts 
with a notional value of $50 million, then its hedge ratio is 0.5.  A firm can increase the correlation 
between its home building revenues and the proceeds from its hedge, and thereby reduce basis risk, by 
adjusting its hedge ratio.  
However, there is a limit to how much a firm can improve the correlation between its home building 
revenues and its hedging proceeds simply by adjusting its hedge ratio. A hedge based on an index that is 
poorly correlated with the price of a firm’s products will ultimately be a less efficient vehicle for reducing 
the volatility of a firm’s internal supply of funds than a hedge based on an index that is highly correlated 
with the prices of a firm’s products. This efficiency can be quantified by measuring the degree to which 
an optimal hedge ratio can reduce the variance of the firm’s hedged revenues.  
Suppose a firm were seeking to reduce the variability of its home building revenues by hedging with a 
forward contract that has a price today of and an end-of-period price of . The firm’s hedged 
revenue, , from selling homes (assuming, for convenience, that a single home is produced) can be 
written as 
0F 1F
vRe
 
( ) ( ),~~eR~ 0101 FFhPPv −−−=  
 
where  is the current revenue per unit,  is the uncertain future revenue and h is a hedge ratio. Using 
basic principles of probability theory, we can express the mean and variance of the above equation as 
follows: 
0P 1
~P
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Note that denotes the expected value and ( )⋅E )(⋅VAR is the variance; r is the correlation coefficient 
between the two random variables, P~ and F~ ; and Pσ  and Fσ are the standard deviations of P~ and F~ , 
respectively. 
To calculate the hedge ratio that minimizes the variance of the firm’s hedged operating revenue, we 
take the derivative of the variance calculated above and set it equal to zero, then solve for . h
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Thus, the optimal hedge ratio, , is estimated as the slope of the regression of home building revenues 
and proceeds from the hedging vehicle. 
*h
By substituting the optimal hedge ratio, , into the variance equation, we can see that the standard 
deviation of the hedged revenues, , depends on the 
*h
)(Re* vσ 2r between P~ and F~ : 
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Thus, we see that the standard deviation of the firm’s unhedged revenues per unit, Pσ , is reduced by 
21 r− . The higher the correlation between the end-of-period revenues and the proceeds from the 
hedge, the greater will be the efficiency of the hedge in reducing risk. However, since the hedge reduces 
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the volatility in the firm’s revenues by the square root of 21 r− , the 2r  must be very high in order for the 
hedge to have a significant impact. For example, an 2r  of 0.80 only reduces the standard deviation by 
55%. To achieve an 80% reduction in the standard deviation, one needs an 2r  of at least 0.96. 
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